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THE ROLE OF TITLE VI IN CHESTER RESIDENTS V. SELF:

Is THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REALLY
BRIGHTER?
KRISTEN

L. RANEY*

With industrial growth comes social and economic
advancement-we hope. But, what many people do not realize is that
some people must live in a polluted environment so that others may live
in an advanced, modem world. The recent societal movement, called
"environmental justice," has grasped this problem-a problem which
many of those who enjoy the fruits of the modem world hardly know
exists.
Environmental justice, also known as environmental racism,
is defined as "any policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects
or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups,
or communities based on race or color."' The concept is based on the
idea that, while hazardous land uses are a necessity, nobody wants to
live near them.2 As a result, according to environmental justice
advocates, locally undesirable environmental land uses (LULUs),
including hazardous waste facilities, solid waste disposal sites, and
contaminated industrial sites, are disproportionately located in minority
communities.' A political, as well as socio-economic phenomenon,
environmental racism results from the lack of political clout and the
lack of financial and legal resources of minorities to fight the location
of these facilities Exacerbating the problem, many of these hazardous
facilities provide much needed jobs for the community.'
It was not until President Clinton's declaration of commitment
to the environmental justice fight, in 1994, that this issue started to gain

'Notes Editor, Journal ofNatural Resources & Environmental Law. B.S., Vanderbilt
University, 1995; J.D. expected, University of Kentucky, December 1999. The author would like
to thank David Arnett and Regina Keller for giving her the idea for this topic.
VI as a Means of Achieving Environmental
'Natalie M. Hammer, Comment, Title
Justice, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 693 (1996) (quoting Robert D. Bullard, EnvironmentalRacism and
"Invisible" Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1037 (1994)).
2
Hammer, supra note I, at 693. This concept is referred to as "not-in-my-backyard,"
or NIMBY. See, e.g, Eileen Gauna, FederalEnvironmentalCitizen Provisions: Obstaclesand
Incentives 3on the Road to EnvironmentalJustice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 33 (1995).
Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A
Critiqueof EnvironmentalJustice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121 (1997).
'Hammer, supranote 1, at 693 n. 10.
'Id. at 693.
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major recognition. 6 Even so, environmental justice actions have been
conspicuously scarce in the case law. This Comment centers on the
recent and perhaps influential Third Circuit case, Chester Residents
Concernedfor Quality Living v. Seif (Chester Residents). Part I of
this Comment will explain the facts, issues, and procedural history of
Chester Residents. Next, the history of environmental justice claims,
including administrative actions and equal protection claims, as well as
the evolution of the citizen suit, will be presented in Part II. Part III will
discuss in more detail the Third Circuit's analysis and basis for its
ruling. Finally, Part IV will present a more detailed analysis of the
Chester Residents decision and how it fits into the environmental
justice context. Included in this discussion will be possible
repercussions of the decision and problems which the decision leaves
unresolved. While the decision in Chester Residents is groundbreaking, because it is a case of first impression (no other circuit court
has decided the issue at hand), the future of environmental justice
claims under Title VI remain precarious.
I. CHESTER RESIDENTS FILE A CITIZEN SUIT UNDER TITLE VI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A. Background
The non-profit corporation Chester Residents Concerned for
Quality Living ("CRCQL") brought suit in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection ("PADEP") and James M. Seif, in his capacity as Secretary
of PADEP.' CRCQL alleged that PADEP discriminates in the process
by which it grants waste facility permits.9 Specifically, the original
complaint asserted that PADEP's grant of the permit violated: (1)
section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

6Steven A. Herman, EnforcementHelps Realize EPA 's Commitment to Environmental
Justice to Improve People's Lives, 12 NO. 9 NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 9 (1997).
President Clinton stated that his administration would be committed to the basic proposition of
equal environmental protection for everyone regardless of race or income. He declared that their
goal would be to "ensure that all communities and persons across this nation live in a safe and
healthful environment-" Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994) (Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations).
7
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Soif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Chester Residents].
11d. at 927.
9Id.
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§2000d et seq.; (2) the EPA's civil rights regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 7.10
et seq.; promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI; and (3)
PADEP's assurance pursuant to the regulations that it would not violate
the regulations.'0 This case represents the appeal concerning Count
Two of the District Court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit."
CRCQL based its findings of discrimination on the fact that,
since 1985, five waste facility permits for sites in Chester (which is in
Delaware County near Philadelphia) have been approved while only
two sites have been approved in the rest of the county.' Delaware
County has a population which is 86.5% white and 11.2% black, while
the town of Chester itself, has a population which is 65.2% black and
33.5% white.' 3 The five facilities to be located within Chester would
increase the total permit waste capacity by over 2,000,000 tons per
year.'4 This is in addition to the DELCORA plant, operating in Chester,
which "had a permit for a sewage waste facility to treat 4-4,000,000
gallons of sewage a day and an air quality permit to incinerate 17,500
tons per year of sewage sludge."'"
B. Procedural History
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the suit on
November 5, 1996 for failure to allege discriminatory intent as required
by section 601 of Title VI. 6 Thejudge, however, entered the dismissal

'old.
1
1d. at 928.
2
" Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seilf, 944 F. Supp. 413,415 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) [hereinafter Chester I].
"Id. at 414.
4
1d. at 415.
1Id.
'61d.
at 413. Section 601 of Title VI states that discriminatory intent is a necessary
element. Since the plaintiff in Chester Residents did not amend the complaint to show
discriminatory intent on the part ofPADEP, the case was dismissed with prejudice on this issue.
On the other hand, Section 602 ofTitle VI leaves open the possibility that ifa disparate impact on
a minority group can be shown, then there may be a private right of action. Basically, section 602
authorizes agencies to distribute federal funds to promulgate regulations implementing section 601.
In 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998), the EPA promulgated such an implementing regulation:
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discriminate because of
their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, orsex.
40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998).
This regulation incorporates a discriminatory effect standard. Therefore, if an agency or group
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without prejudice so that CRCQL could amend the complaint to assert
discriminatory intent. 7 In addition, thejudge issued an order certifying
the question of what must be alleged in the complaint to the Third
Circuit, conditioned on the court's granting of permission to appeal.' 8
The Third Circuit initially denied CRCQL's petition for leave to appeal
on its complaint on January 30, 1997 and remanded the case to the
lower court.' 9 When CRCQL declined to amend its complaint, the
district courtjudge dismissed it with prejudice, clearing the way for a
direct appeal to the Third Circuit.2" The district court also dismissed
the CRCQL's other claims under EPA regulations,2 ' citing the Third
Circuit's ruling in Chowdhury v. ReadingHospital& Medical Center.22
The district court understood Chowdhury as holding that regulations
promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act do not create a
private right of action.23 The district court interpreted Chowdhury as
saying that more than discriminatory effects must be shown in order for
a private citizens group to maintain an action against a federally funded
agency; rather, discriminatory intent under section 601 of Title VI must
be shown.
The primary issue on appeal was whether a suit by private
citizens may be maintained under section 602 of Title VI.24 In other
words, can a citizen group maintain an action by showing
discriminatory effect rather than outright intent to discriminate? 25 In a
multi-faceted opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the district court's ruling. On December 30, 1997, the Third Circuit
ruled that the CRCQL did in fact have a private right of action under
section 602 of Title VI.2 6 While the Third Circuit stated that the district
court had misinterpreted its ruling in Chowdhury, ultimately the court

receiving federal funds does not adhere to these regulations, then this funding may be cut off, and
a citizen suit may be maintained. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132
F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir. 1997). See also 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998). This issue will be discussed
in detail later in the comment.
"iChesterl, 944 F. Supp. at 418.
18d
191d.

'Old.
21
1d. at 417-418.
22
Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cit. 1982).
2
Chester 1, 944 F.Supp. at 417.
24
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir.
1997).

25
261d.

1d.
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found that more was needed upon which to base its ruling.27
Subsequently, after investigating the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in GuardiansAssociation v. Civil Service Commission," the
Third Circuit decided that while supportive, Guardians was not
dispositive.29 Finally, the court further supported its ruling on its own
precedent: the three-prong test for determining when it is appropriate
to infer a private right of action to enforce regulations, established in
PolaroidCorp. v. Disney.3

H.

HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

Before delving into the Third Circuit's analysis, it is important
that a brief overview of the environmental justice movement is
provided. Again, Chester Residents is essentially a case of first
impression. The use of Title VI as a route for the environmental racism
plaintiff is a fairly new trend." Before the use of Title VI, there were
a few, ultimately unsuccessful, alternatives for the environmental
racism plaintiff.
A. Common Law Nuisance Claims
One of the most basic alternatives is the nuisance action,
based on common law property rights. 2 Problems associated with
proving causation and procedural obstacles, such as statutes of
limitations, often bar recovery. 3' Another disadvantage of the nuisance
action is the fact that relief is in the form of damages rather than
injunctive relief. 4 Thus, while the plaintiff apparently is being

"Id.

'Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
"Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 931.

IId at 933 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988)).
"See, Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet?
EnvironmentalRacism in the Context ofPolitical-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH.

J.RACE & L. 1(1996). In this article the authors encourage the feasibility of Title VI as a solution
for environmental racism plaintiffs, but stress that ultimately, the real solution lies in a total change
in our political and socio-economic processes, perhaps requiring a grass-roots movement.
'See Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981), af'dmem., 696
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1982).
33Hammer, supra note 1, at 700 (citing Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims
Brought Under Title Vl of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 310 n. 116 (1995)). Causation

was often difficult to prove because of the lack of data concerning the connection between the
alleged damaging pollution and health problems, In addition, courts had difficulty finding an
which was done pursuant to a valid environmental permit.
activity unreasonable
4
3

Id.
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compensated for any property damage he sustained, the polluting
activity would still continue without an injunction to halt it."

The

awarding of property damages does not help the plaintiff who has
suffered health problems which are very real, but difficult to assign an
adequate monetary value.

B. Statutory Citizen Suits
Another route taken by environmental justice plaintiffs is that
authorized by the federal or state statutes themselves. 6 Most of the

environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions authorizing
citizen suits, which in effect give the citizen-plaintiff "attorney general
status" to sue on behalf of other members of the community.37 The

substantive basis of this type of lawsuit does not involve racial
discrimination, but it is, at the least, a way of halting the operations of
The plaintiff in the present case, CRCQL, actually
a facility.
attempted this route to no avail. 9 The plaintiff sued Delcora, a sewage
treatment plant, for violating the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et

seq., by failing to comply with a Pennsylvania state odor emission
CRCQL also alleged that Delcora violated the
regulation.40
Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act, 35 P.S. §4001 et seq.4

Actions under environmental law statutes have not been particularly
successful, either. The lawsuits tend to be too broad, preventing them

35

1d. (citing Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 25 EVNTL. L. 285, 310 n. 117 (1995)). This is assuming there is actual
property damage. The limit to damages instead ofinjunctive relief defeats the purpose ofthe entire
lawsuit if the hazardous activity can continue as usual after the lawsuit. Also, damages tends to
reward one plaintiff instead of many, i.e. with citizen suits, a plaintiff sues on behalf of several
people in hopes of ceasing the hazardous activity. Id.
36
1d. The primary statute which gives the public a voice is National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1989 & Supp. 1995). This statute contains many
procedural limitations that can be used to challenge a siting decision. Hammer, supra note 1, at
701 (citing Hope Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models ofJustice, 14 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1995)).

3'Gauna, supra note 2, at 40-41. "Although private attorney general status is not
without controversy, private enforcement remains an important part of environmental regulation."
Id. at41. 3
SHammer, supra note 1, at 700 (citing Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental
Justice:" The DistributionalEffects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 828
(1993)).
39
Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Delcora Sewage Treatment Plant,
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1994).
No. 94-5639,
45 1994 WL 618476
Id. at *1.
41
1d. at *1.
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from addressing problems of a more local nature.42 In addition, the
relief offered under federal environmental statutes tends to be either an

equitable remedy or a civil penalty.43 While equitable remedies are in
many cases preferred, civil penalties, on the other hand, may be
problematic because the Supreme Court has ruled that the money must
be paid to the federal treasury.44 In addition, often the focus of the

lawsuit is on a single permit or site and does not take into consideration
the impact of surrounding sites. 5 Therefore, it is possible to have
several sites in a vicinity, each adhering to NEPA standards, but, in the
aggregate, causing environmental problems. 6
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has

also been an avenue taken by environmental justice plaintiffs.47 The
problems with this course of action are apparent in the case at hand.
Even though the plaintiff, CRCQL, did not bring this suit under the
Equal Protection Clause, the same problems inherent in proving a Title
VI claim are inherent in proving discrimination under the Equal

Protection Clause. First, the plaintiff must show that the governmental
entity made a decision with the intent of discriminating against a

minority or a protected group.48 Because of practical reasons, meeting

this requirement is a nearly impossible endeavor.49 The Supreme
Court, however, has also held that if discriminatory effect can be

"Hammer, supra note 1, at 702 (citing Hope Babcock, EnvironmentalJustice Clinics:
Visible Models ofJustice, 14 STAN. ENvTL L.J. 3 (1995)).
3
1d. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987)).
"Id. Again, equitable penalties are many times preferred because a plaintiff may get
an injunction, which will help the entire community. A civil penalty paid to the treasury, on the
other hand, will inevitably be diluted and have less of a chance of having a direct benefit to the
citizens.
.,Id. at 702 (citing James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk:
IncorporatingCommunity Perceptions into EnvironmentalRisk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 547 (1994)).
6Id.

"The Fourteenth Amendment states that "no state shall...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
4'Hammer, supra note 1, at 702-703. See also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976). Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264266 (1977).
"Quite simply, it is difficult to compile the evidence and data necessary to prove that
a defendant intentionally discriminated against a minority or protected class. Many courts require
such a showing of intentional discrimination; often times, a mere showing of disparate impact to
prove discrimination is simply not enough.
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shown, then a claim may be successful without showing intentional
discrimination.

In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

Housing,"° the Supreme Court stated five categories within which
discriminatory effect may suffice for maintaining an equal protection
claim." I These standards, however, may be difficult to meet. If the

defendant can state an equally satisfactory non-discriminatory
explanation for the law, then the plaintiff's claim can easily be
defeated. 2 Illustrating an example of this problem in the environmental
justice field is Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp." This
case clearly showed disparate impact, but the lack of a direct

discriminatory effect still served as a bar to prosecution. 54 The court
would not accept the circumstantial evidence of an African American
highschool located 1,700 feet from a landfill as direct enough evidence

of a discriminatory effect to maintain an equal protection suit.
The main problem with the Equal Protection Clause as a route
for the environmental justice plaintiff is the difficulty in showing
discriminatory intent." Even though the Supreme Court has stated that
disparate discriminatory impact can be shown in order to maintain an
Equal Protection action, the fact that the defendant can give almost any
acceptable non-discriminatory explanation for the disparate impact

places a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff. 6 So, there may be a
disproportionate impact on a minority community, but most plaintiffs
have failed in providing a direct enough link between the alleged
discrimination and the defendant's actions.

" Village ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
"Id. at 264-68. The five categories are: (1) whether the impact is racially disparate, (2)
the historical background of the decision, (3) the sequence of events that led to the decision, (4)
any departures from the normal decision-making process, and (5) the legislative or administrative
history.
5See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. Vocabulary and reading exams for
incoming police officers tended to discriminate against minority and impoverished candidates.
The state's goal, however, of having "literate and well-spoken officers" proved to be a satisfactory
response to the discriminatory effect of the tests.
"Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D. Tex.
1979).
"Id. In Bean, a solid waste disposal facility was located within 1,700 feet of a
predominately African-American high school which did not have air conditioning. Even though
the Supreme Court found this to be "unfortunate and insensitive," the circumstantial evidence did
not establish discriminatory intent as required by Arlington Heights.
"SHammer, supra note I, at 705.
'See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
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D. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI provides a private right of action to people who can
show that they have been discriminated against on the basis of race,
national origin, or color in programs receiving federal funding. 7
Section 601 of Title VI requires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory
intent on the part of the governmental entity as a necessary element of
an action for monetary relief under this act.5 8 Like in the equal
protection cases, the problems inherent in proving intentional
discrimination end up defeating even legitimate claims. 9 Also similar
to equal protection claims, Title VI provides a way in which a plaintiff
can maintain a suit by showing mere discriminatory effect.' Section
602 authorizes agencies to distribute federal funds to promulgate
regulations implementing section 601 6 As revealed by the language
in the EPA's implementing statute, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), agencies
receiving federal funding may not enforce practices which have the
"effect" of discrimination based on race, color, national origin, or sex.62
In order to enforce this regulation, applicants for EPA assistance must
submit an assurance with their applications stating that they will
comply with these guidelines. If an applicant accepts the EPA's
financial assistance, then the applicant impliedly accepts the obligation

not to discriminate.63
In the environmental justice realm, showing discriminatory

effect may be quite difficult, as demonstrated by Coalition of

5
Hamrnmer,
58

supra note I, at 706.
The Supreme Court construed Section 601 of Title VI as requiring a showing of
intentional discrimination in order for plaintiffs to maintain an action for monetary relief.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983). See also Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
"InGuardians, for example, the Supreme Court held that Black and Hispanic members
of city police department's "last-hired, first-fired" policy were not entitled to compensatory relief
463 U.S. at 582.
in absence of showing intentional discrimination. Guardians Ass "n,
6
Section 602 of Title VI authorizes agencies to distribute federal funds to promulgate
regulations implementing section 601. Because the EPA has promulgated such an implementing
regulation, any agency receiving federal money from the EPA, but which discriminates based on
race, color, national origin, or sex, may lose its federal funding. Stated in the EPA's implementing
regulation, if a program has theeffect of discriminating against a minority group then action can
be taken, such as cutting off federal funding. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir. 1997). See also 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998).
61Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at928. See also Section 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1992).
6240 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998).
63Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927. See also 40 C.F.R. §7.80(a)(1) (1998).
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ConcernedCitizens Against 1-670 v. Damian.64 In Damian, a citizen
group, composed mainly of African Americans who lived near a
proposed highway construction site, sued state and federal officials, in
federal district court, for violating public involvement requirements of
regulations promulgated under the Federal-Aid Highway Act. 5 The
district court held that the government officials met their burden of
justifyingthe location of the proposed highway." In addition, plaintiffs
failed to show that there were any appropriate alternatives to the
proposed construction site. 7 In conclusion, if a defendant in a Civil
Rights Act case can enumerate satisfactory reasons for the location of
a site in response to the charge of discriminatory effect, then the
plaintiff will lose if an equally satisfactory alternative to the
defendant's siting choice is not offered.
Some courts have denied relief after balancing the relative
hardships on all the parties involved. In Goshen Road v. US.
DepartmentofAgriculture,6 a citizen group filed an action under Title
VI and NEPA, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
operation of a nearby wastewater treatment facility. 9 On the citizen
group's motion for a temporary restraining order, the court used a
"balancing of hardships" test, which in this particular case tilted in
favor of denying the order.70 Even assuming that the plaintiffs suffered
irreparable harm as a result of the continued operation of the
wastewater facility, the court ruled that the defendant, if the plant were
closed, would bear more of a hardship than the plaintiffs, as would the
general public in not having such a facility.7' This case is a prime
illustration of a minority group forced to suffer the brunt of
environmental contamination so that the community at large can reap
the benefits of a wastewater treatment facility.
One more significant problem associated with suits brought
under Title VI concerns the measuring of disparate impact.72 Most of
the past studies have used methods of measurement such as zip codes

'Coalition

of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.

Ohio 1984).
651d. at 112.
"6d.
at 127.
67

1d. at 127-28.
'Goshen Rd. Envtl. Action v. United States Dep't of Agric., 891 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.

N.C. 1995).
61d. at 1127.
7
1d.
71

1d
72

at 1132.

Hammer, supra note 1, at 709.
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or census tracks, but these pre-set units of measurement really have no
connection with the location or effect of the hazardous facility, thereby
causing the results to be artificial." Consequently, this renders the
results easily manipulated by courts and agencies.74 For example,
"[w]hen the plaintiffs in Bean used census tracts as the unit of
measurement, the court suggested that a more closely tailored unit of
measurement might have helped their case."" "In contrast, in East
Bibb, the court relied on census tracts and rejected plaintiffs' use of a
6
Until a
larger commission district as the unit of measurement."
standardized system of measuring disparate impact is agreed upon, the
present inconsistencies apparent in the case law will continue to plague
Title VI and equal protection claims.
III. THE BASIS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT' S DECISION IN CHESTER

RESIDEWTS
A. The Court's Investigation of Supreme Court Rulings-Guardians
& Alexander
No other court has ruled on the precise issue presented in
Chester Residents." The issue, as defined by the Third Circuit, is
"whether a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect
regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies pursuant to
section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d et seq."'
The Third Circuit first looked to the Supreme Court for
guidance on whether a citizen suit could be maintained by showing
9
The
discriminatory impact pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI.
private
"(1)
a
Supreme Court has ruled as follows in previous case law:
right of action exists under section 601 of Title VI that requires

"Id. (citing Michael Fisher, EnvironmentalJustice Claims Brought Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 25 EVNTL. L. 285, 323 (1995)).

74Id.

71d.at 709 n. 155 (citing Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp.

673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979)).
'1d. (citing East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning
& Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880,884-85 (M.D. Ga. 1989)). While both EastBibb and Bean
involved claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the problem of measuring the discriminatory

impact is equally problematic in Title VI cases.
"Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936 (3d Cir.
1997).
"Id.at 927.
"Id. at 928.
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plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination; and (2) discriminatory
effect regulations promulgated by agencies pursuant to section 602 are
valid exercises of their authority under that section."8" The Supreme
Court, however, did not explicitly address whether a private right of
action exists under discriminatory effect regulations enacted pursuant
to section 602."' Nevertheless, the Third Circuit said that, although not
explicitly decided by the Supreme Court in Guardians,2 it can be
inferred that relief could be granted in discriminatory effect cases. The
Third Circuit based this inference on the fact that five Justices said that
injunctive and declarative relief are available in discriminatory effect
cases. 83 However, because the Supreme Court did not directly address
this question, the Chester Residents court would not hold that
Guardianswas dispositive of the present appeal."
The Third Circuit also considered Alexander v. Choate," the
case in which the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Guardians.6
The court, however, did not agree with CRCQL's argument that
Alexander stands for the proposition that Guardiansshould be read to
allow private plaintiffs an action under a disparate impact standard."7
The Third Circuit stated that, because the Supreme Court spoke in the
passive voice ("could make actionable"), that it could only infer a
private right of action. 8 The Third Circuit found no direct authority in
Alexander that either confirmed or denied the existence of a private
right of action, and it did not want to base its entire decision on the
holdings in Guardiansand Alexander.89
B. Third Circuit Investigates Its Own Precedent: The Interpretation of
Chowdhury and the PolaroidThree-Prong Test
Because the Third Circuit could not find any direct authority
with the Supreme Court's decisions, it decided to look towards its own
precedent. The district court relied on the Third Circuit's decision in

'Id. at 929 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985)).
"Id at 929.
"Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
"Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 93 1.
14Id.

"Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
'Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 93 1.
"Id.
"Ild.
"Id

CHESTER RESIDENTS V. SElF

1998-99]

Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center' in denying the
plaintiffs a private right of action. 9 The Third Circuit, however, held
that the district court had erred in interpreting Chowdhury as holding
a private right of action does not exist under the regulations
promulgated by EPA pursuant to section 602.' Rather, the holding in
Chowdhury states that neither section 602 nor its implementing
regulations expressly gives private plaintiffs a role in the administrative
proceeding after initiation of a complaint.93 In addition, Chowdhury
held that a plaintiff should not be required to pursue an administrative
complaint prior to filing a complaint under section 601.'4 In essence,
the Chowdhury decision really did not address the issue at hand.
Therefore, Chowdhury, too, was held not to be dispositive of the
appeal.9"
The court then turned to the three-prong test it laid out in
PolaroidCorp. v. Disney.9 The test requires the court to consider the
following factors when deciding whether or not to imply a private right
of action: "(1) 'whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of
the enabling statute'; (2) 'whether the statute under which the rule was
promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of
action'; and (3) 'whether implying a private right of action will further
the purpose of the enabling statute."' 97 When applying this test to the
facts in Chester Residents, the court decided that the first prong was
satisfied by the EPA's discriminatory effect regulation; rather, the
decision of the court relied on the second and third prongs.98
1. Second Prong: Did the statute under which the rule was
promulgated properly permit the implication of a private
right of action?
The court ultimately rejected the defendant's argument that
implying a private right of action would be inconsistent with the
legislative scheme that makes EPA a "gatekeeper" to enforcement."

"Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982).
1
" Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 932.

921d.

931d

"Id.

9Id"
9Id. at 933 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,994 (3d Cir. 1988)).
7

1d. (quoting Polaroid,862 F.2d at 994) (citations omitted).

981d.

"Id. at 934-36.
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The state developed this argument based on the numerous procedural
requirements laid out in section 602. I°0 The Third Circuit, however,
countered this argument with a more convincing argument that the
procedural requirements are necessary to provide notice to recipients
of federal funds that their funding may be terminated if they do not
comply with the requirements laid out in Title VI. 0' Therefore, the
court concluded that these are notice provisions and safeguards to
"cushion the blow" of potentially losing funding.'
Significantly, the
loss of federal funding is a consequence which can only be brought
03
about by an agency and not through a private citizen suit.' Thus, the
implication that a private citizen may maintain an action would not be
inconsistent with the procedural safeguards of providing notice to the
potential defendant.' 4
2. Third Prong: Would the implication of a private right of
action further the purpose of the statute?
The court looked at Cannon v. University of Chicago'D to
determine that the third prong was sitisfied because the implication of
a private right of action under section 602, plus the EPA regulations
will further the dual purposes of Title VI.'1 6 The dual purposes of Title
VI art, to "(1) combat discrimination by entities who receive federal
funds; and (2) provide citizens with effective protection against
discrimination.' ' 0 7 The Third Circuit held that a private right of action
would further these purposes by giving citizens private attorney general
status in order to enforce section 602. ~ In conclusion, the court held
that the third prong was satisfied."0 9

1
at 934-35.
°,d.
1011d.
'Id at 936.

104Id

'Id.at 934 n.12. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Although Cannon dealt with Title IX, the Court determined that the drafters of Title IX intended
it to be modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; simply substitute the word "sex"
in Title XI to replace the words "race, color, or national origin" in Title VI.
" ChesterResidents, 132 F.3d at 936.
"'Id. (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704).
108Id.
1091d.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CHESTER
RESIDENTS

The Third Circuit's decision in Chester Residents is groundbreaking and has the potential of opening the door more widely for
similar complaints; however, as with many cases of first impression,
particularly controversial ones, it is difficult to consider this a clear
victory for more than the time being. While there are many positive
aspects to this decision, there remain many questions unanswered and
many problems unresolved.
A. Positive Aspects of the Decision
The Third Circuit was very thorough in its analysis of the
existing body of law and how it justified its decision in light of that
law. It was valiant in attempting to find roots in previous decisions for
a case that, in essence, presents a completely new issue. With a
creative use of both Supreme Court cases and it's own precedent, the
Third Circuit was able to find other decisions which at least partially
supported its ruling; therefore, perhaps in the aggregate, the decisions
put forth by the Third Circuit will support its ruling in Chester
Residents. Is that not how courts decide issues of first impression?
The plaintiff, CRCQL, used inferences taken from Guardians and
Alexander to support its argument that the Supreme Court has implied
that a private right of action exists under disparate impact
regulations."' The Third Circuit recognized the merits of CRCQL's
arguments, but it was wise in ruling that neither Guardians and
Alexander were dispositive of the issue on appeal. Seemingly, basing
a decision on an inference or implication and not on an issue directly
before a court would heighten the danger of reversal. By using its own
test, the Polaroid three-prong test, the Third Circuit was able to narrow
the issues and apply more Supreme Court decisions to the facts at
hand."' The test was clear and provided a framework within which the
Third Circuit could work.

0
" See generally Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925
(3d Cir. 1997).
"'See id.
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B. Considering Chester Residents Within a Broader Context Brownfields.
Perhaps most significantly, the decision has provided a voice
for the citizens who are affected the most by environmentally
hazardous sites. Although the case at hand does not deal directly with
"Brownfields,"" 2 it is worth consideringthis case within the brownfield
context in order to appreciate some of the potential repercussions.
In many ways, the redevelopment of brownfields is in direct
conflict with the goals of environmental justice. According to
Professor Kirsten Engel of Tulane Law School, it depends upon how
one interprets environmental justice goals." 3 For example, according
to the "market-based" theory, there does not exist as much of a
conflict." 4 Such advocates believe that redeveloping a brownfield in
a depressed or minority section of a city by building another factory
will serve as an economic building block for the community." 5
According to this theory, the best thing that can happen to citizens in
disadvantaged areas is more jobs." 6 On the other hand, proponents of
the main opposing theory, a more "right-based" theory, would disagree
on the theory that the building of yet another factory will provide a
cyclical effect: a vicious cycle in which disadvantaged citizens would
be forced to exchange their health forjobs." 7 According to this theory,
while depressed communities might be provided jobs, again they are
forced to carry on a lower standard of living, which is actually
dangerous to their health, and more than likely, the site will become yet
another brownfield in twenty or so years--whenever the factory closes.
Professor Engel does suggest some solutions."' The main solution
which involves the Chester Residents decision is quite simply

"'Brownfields, according to U.S. EPA, are "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial
and commercial sites where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
environmental contamination." U.S. EPA, OFFCEOFPUBLICAFFAiRS, BAsic BROWNFIELDS FACT
SHEET (1995). The goal of both scholars and business people is to some extent, the development
of these sites so that they may become productive pieces of land, therefore preventing the use and
subsequent possible contamination of "greenfields" (undeveloped and uncontaminated lands).
Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and the Requirements of Market-Base, Rights Based
and PragmaticConceptionsofEnvironmentalJustice, Unpublished Topical Outline, Journal of
Natural Resources & Environmental Law 1998 Symposium on Brownfields (on file with the
Journalof NaturalResources and Environmental Law).
1131d.

1 151jd.

161d.
I&Id
1'"ld
"
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community involvement in the decisions, such as brownfields, which
so intimately effect these communities." 9 Admittedly, by the time a
case gets to trial, community involvement may have failed at some
point. But, allowing a citizen group to maintain a suit can serve to
promote community involvement and hopefully trickle down to the
earlier stages of a transaction. Arguably, if a community is aware that
it has a legal remedy, then perhaps the community will feel more
confident in getting involved earlier in the decision process-before it
gets to trial. This is, therefore, one context in which the Chester
Residents decision may have some significant repercussions.
On the other hand, there are many reasons why the Chester
Residents decision falls short. It should be noted that these
shortcomings cannot be blamed on the Third Circuit; certain issues
simply were not before the court at this juncture. Rather, this analysis
seeks to prove the point that environmental justice claims under Title
VI still have quite a ways to go. No doubt, determining that a citizen
grcup can maintain an action under section 602, based on disparate
discriminatory effect, is very significant. As discussed earlier with the
equal protection claims and other Title VI claims, the plaintiff still has
the hurdle of actually showing discriminatory effect. 20 The Third
Circuit has reversed and remanded the district court's decision,
meaning that the CRCQL must now show that there is a
disproportionate discriminatory effect. 2' Then, if the PADEP can give
any reasons justifying the siting of the facility, CRCQL must come up
with a feasible alternative. 2 2 Therefore, while the Third Circuit's
decision initially seems to lighten the plaintiff's burden by not having
to prove discriminatory intent, this lightening of the burden is
somewhat misleading.
Another drawback with the decision is that under Title VI, the
citizen group must sue an agency which receives federal funding.
Often, this agency will be a state agenpy, like in the present case,
which simply is in charge of the licensing. For the most part, such

"'Id. Professor Engel's other two suggestions are as follows: (!)

completion of

government or independent research studies demonstrating that environmental liability is
responsible in substantial measure for the lack of development of brownfield sites; (2) that the
local community be afforded real economic opportunities, like jobs,job training, and opportunities
for new or spin-offbusiness start-ups-as part of any redevelopment proposal that reduces cleanup
standards or immunizes any potentially responsible parties.
"'See Coalition ofConcerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp 110 (S.D.
Ohio 1984).

"'Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
"'See id.
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agencies are created to improve the environmental situation, by creating
regulations and procedures to keep industry in check. Therefore, in
many cases, the industry in charge of creating environmental hazards
escapes the brunt of the blame and responsibility. It is true that the
particular factory may lose its permit, but at this point, the chances of
relocating to another minority community are very high. One must also
acknowledge the fact that these industries can lose a significant amount
of money by having to relocate; one cannot argue that the industry,
factory, or other business will not be damaged in some way. However,
if a factory is not sued directly, but rather through the agency which
licensed it, much of the effect of such a lawsuit is lost.
Ultimately, this case is groundbreaking because it decided an
issue which has never been before a court as high as the United States
Court of Appeals. It provides a voice for the citizens involved in such
litigation, not only technically by allowing them to maintain an action,
but also on a wider scale. Such a notable decision has the opportunity
to educate the public concerning the problems of environmental justice
that the residents of Chester live with every day. Even if this case is
eventually overturned, this type of decision can create publicity which
in the long run may prove to be even more effective. This may be just
a start-but, it is a good one.

Since the writing of this comment, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorarito hear Chester Residents.' For a short time,
Chester Residents was destined to be the first environmental justice
case of its kind to go to our nation's highest tribunal. This destiny,
however, changed when Pennsylvania regulators withdrew the
controversial permit to build a waste treatment facility in Chester
County, Pennsylvania.' 24 This effectively rendered the issue, upon
which the Supreme Court was to rule, moot. In response to the
withdrawal of the permit, the Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living filed a motion on July 29, 1998 with the Supreme Court asking
that the case be dismissed because the issue was now moot. The Court
agreed with Chester Residents and vacated the suit without comment. 5
roChester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 118 S.Ct. 2296 (1998).
" 4Round the States Supreme Court Dismisses Pa. Lawsuit on Permitting Waste
Treatment Plants,HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, August 24, 1998 WL 10239936,
"'Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 1998 WL 477242 (U.S.
August 17, 1998).
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What does this mean for ChesterResidents and environmental
justice? First, the fact that the Supreme Court granted certiorariclearly
shows that the high court finds this to be an important and opportune
issue. In addition, granting the Chester Resident's motion to vacate is
very significant-it basically means that the Supreme Court was willing
to set aside the issue, rather than overturning the Third Circuit's
decision-a move that could prove devastating to the future of
environmental justice. So, environmental justice advocates certainly
cannot be too disappointed about the Supreme Court's decision-it
leaves the Third Circuit's ruling intact and gives environmental justice
advocates more time to plan their next move.

